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Abstract. There are parallels between the operation of closed-end funds and in the United
Kingdom property companies. In both types of corporations, the market capitalization
is commonly less than the net asset value (NAV) of the assets owned by the ﬁrms. This
article investigates the relationship between the NAV of U.K. property companies and
their market capitalizations. We ﬁrst examine the hypothesis that discounts are the result
of agency costs, contingent capital gains tax liability and a number of other ﬁrm speciﬁc
factors. We then examine the hypothesis that discounts result from the interaction of
noise traders and rational investors. The evidence suggests that both hypotheses have
utility in explaining property company discounts.
Introduction
Property companies have been a part of the real estate scene in the United Kingdom
for well over a hundred years (Scott, 1996) and currently represent the dominant
vehicle by which property is securitized in the U.K. On the International Stock
Exchange in London, the listed property company sector has a market capitalization
of approximately £14bn, or 2% of the total value of U.K. equities. In aggregate, it
owns about 12% of the real estate in the U.K. institutional property market (Currie
and Scott, 1991; and adjusted by Barkham and Geltner, 1995).
Property companies engage in two forms of activity: investment and trading, with
development sometimes being undertaken in support of these activities. Investment
consists of the acquisition and subsequent holding of property assets, while trading
involves the purchase of property interests for resale in the short term. The process
of trading may involve the property companies redeveloping existing buildings but
broadly, one can categorize property companies into investor companies (holding
relatively stable portfolios of properties) and trading companies (holding a changing
portfolio of properties). The majority of property companies on the U.K. stock
exchange are investment companies.1 Property companies are subject to no special
tax legislation.
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Property companies have their property investment assets appraised annually and the
current aggregate value of the investment stock is shown in each company’s Annual
Report and Accounts.2 Property companies thus provide, on an annual basis, an
accurate estimate of their total and net asset value (NAV). Thus, it has long been
recognized that the market capitalization of property companies is less than their stated
NAVs. Exhibit 1 shows the average property sector discount to NAV constructed by
SBC Warburg. The mean discount over the period studied was 22.4% but it varied
from a maximum of 53% to a premium of 29%.
That property company shares trade at a discount to their NAV is one of the most
intriguing aspects of the market for real estate securities in the U.K. On its own, the
discount to NAV might be thought merely an accounting curiosity. Three factors make
it worth investigating. First, the fact that property companies publish both the book
value and the market value of their investment assets on an annual basis means that
the discount is not a pure artifact of accounting procedures. The second and more
important factor is that property companies may be regarded as a special case of
closed-end fund.3 It has long been recognized that closed-end funds commonly trade
at a discount to NAV. Since closed-end funds have attracted attention in the research
literature means that there is a ‘ready supply’ of hypotheses about the causes of the
discount to NAV in closed-end funds that may be applied to property companies.
Third is that there has been very little empirical research on the discount to NAV in
U.K. securitized real estate.4 Barkham and Geltner (1995) found that, in the long run,
the value of property company shares is fundamentally linked to the performance of
the property market. Very little work has examined whether in the short run property
company shares are more closely associated with the stock market or with the direct
real estate market though this topic has received considerable attention in the United
States (see Corgel, Mcintosh and Ott, 1995, for a review). The purpose of this article,
therefore, is to report the results of an empirical investigation into the discount to
NAV in listed property companies.5
There are two approaches to investigating the discount to NAV in closed-end funds:
the ‘rational’ approach and the ‘noise trader’ or ‘sentiment’ approach. The rational
approach represents a network of hypotheses that link the discount to NAV to company
speciﬁc factors such as management quality, tax liability and the type of stocks held
by the fund. Despite the intuitive appeal of the rational approach to closed-end fund
discounts the studies have not successfully explained the variance in closed-end fund
discounts or why the discount to NAV in closed-end funds varies so much over time.
The variation over time in the average sector discount is not only a feature of closed-
end funds but also property companies, as shown in Exhibit 1.
The second approach, which is generally described as the noise trader model, is
associated with the work of Shiller (1989), De Long, Shleifer, Summers and
Waldmann (1990) and Shleifer and Vishny (1990). The model is conceptually complex
and posits the existence of two types of investors operating in the market; the rational
trader and the noise trader. In essence, the operation of the noise traders provides an
additional risk that is reﬂected in the value and returns of stocks. Not only does the
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in the short run but that securities will be priced below fundamental values in
equilibrium. The noise trader approach has been applied to closed-end fund discounts
by Lee, Shleifer and Thaler (1991) with some success.
The structure of the article is as follows. The next section explains the rational
approach and presents evidence that calls into question its ability to fully explain
property company discounts. Next, a more detailed exposition of the noise trader or
sentiment approach to discounts is presented, followed by the results of testing this
approach. The ﬁnal section is the conclusion.
The Rational Approach to the Discount to NAV
Framework of Analysis
A number of studies have addressed the discount to NAV in the closed-end fund
literature and Malkiel (1995)6 provides a useful recent summary of the rational
approach. There has been very little work in either the U.K. or the U.S. on the subject
of property company (or REIT) discounts. Research on REIT discounts is hindered
by the fact that REITs do not have their assets appraised or published on a regular
basis. One interesting study of REIT discounts is by Capozza and Lee (1996). They
estimate REIT asset values by applying a constructed portfolio cap rate to the net
operating income reported in REIT report and accounts. The results of Capozza and
Lee are referred to below, although there has to be some doubt as to the strength of
their ﬁndings because their reliance on average cap rates ignores many of the micro-
level factors that determine individual property values (and therefore NAVs). The work
of Adams and Venmore-Rowland (1989) is closer to this study. These authors discuss
several ‘rational’ hypotheses about property company discounts but they do not test
them with any degree of rigor. The most important factors cited by the above authors
in explaining the discount to net assets are as follows.
Unrealized Capital Appreciation. Closed-end fund NAVs are based on the market value
of the securities they hold.7 If a fund holds securities that have appreciated, the sale
of these securities would incur capital gains tax. Thus, the NAV is not necessarily
what shareholders would realize in the event of a fund being liquidated. In principle,
the same argument can be applied to property companies. Many property investment
companies have substantial unrealized reserves as part of their capital due to the
upward movement in the value of their assets. Revenue from the sale of this property
would be subject to taxation. Adams and Venmore-Rowland (1989) show that a
reduction in contingent tax liability the 1980s, due to changes in tax legislation, may
have had led to some small reduction in individual property company discounts.
However, they also show that substantial discounts exist even when post-tax NAVs
are calculated.
Insider Ownership. Malkiel (1995) argues that insider ownership may increase the
discount because it reduces the likelihood that a fund will be taken over and liquidated
at the NAV. Property companies are frequently taken over by other companies but are
rarely taken over in order to be liquidated. However, insider ownership may reduce
the prospect of a take-over bid being launched, the opportunity for proﬁtable arbitrageINVESTOR SENTIMENT AND NOISE TRADERS 295
and therefore widen the discount. On the other hand, if the directors of the company
are important shareholders there is less likelihood of conﬂicts of interest between the
non-directorial shareholders and the management. This would suggest lower discounts
in ﬁrms with high insider ownership.
Expense Ratios. High expenses represent dead-weight losses to the investor and might
be expected to be correlated with high discounts. Historically, property companies in
the U.K. have attracted considerable criticism from fund managers because their
management expenses are alleged to be excessive. In the U.S., Capozza and Lee
(1996) ﬁnd some evidence that REIT discounts are correlated with expense ratios.
Reputation. Malkiel (1995) argues that a history of good performance may result in a
management gaining a ‘premium rating.’ Adams and Venmore-Rowland (1989) also
assert that the market capitalization, and therefore the discount, is affected by the
market’s perception of the entrepreneurial ability of the company’s management. It is
very difﬁcult to measure this type of factor but Malkiel suggests that some measure
of achieved returns might be used as a proxy variable.
Size. When reporting their ﬁnancial position, property companies have each individual
property appraised at the open market value. If a company was forced to sell its entire
stock, it could lead to a considerable addition to the normal ﬂow of property in the
market. Thus, the aggregate value of a company’s assets is not necessarily the sum
of the values of the individual properties. It can be hypothesized that companies with
larger holdings would face greater illiquidity and they would therefore have larger
discounts. However, size might affect discount in some other ways. Adams and
Venmore-Rowland (1989) argue that for high value properties, access to capital acts
as a barrier to entry into the market. They argue, along with Gau (1987), that restricted
competition leads to the inefﬁcient pricing of high value properties and to
opportunities for larger institutions, with access to capital, to earn abnormal returns
from the larger properties. For this reason and because larger property companies
have the market power to assemble larger ‘more extraordinary development schemes,’
larger companies might be associated with a lower discount to NAV. This latter
argument must be treated with some caution. The U.K. property market is the focus
of attention from a wide range of international investors, many of considerable size
(DTZ Debenham Thorpe, 1995) and global perspective (Baum, 1995), which makes
inefﬁcient pricing of high value properties unlikely. Nor is it at all apparent that large
development schemes should be more proﬁtable than small ones. On balance,
therefore, we tentatively conclude from this line of argument that large companies
might exhibit larger discounts due to the discrete nature of asset valuation in the U.K.
Although Capozza and Lee (1996) ﬁnd that small REITs have the largest discounts,
they also ﬁnd that small REITs appear to have the highest expense ratios and these
two effects are not disentangled.
Financial Factors. Debt can have an affect on the discount to NAV by virtue of the
way in which the discount is calculated. For instance, a ﬁrm with no debt, book assets
of $100 and shares valued at $80 in the market might have a discount of 20%. If the
ﬁrm issues $40 of debt to repurchase $40 of equity, the book value of net assets will
fall to $60 but the market value of shares, ceteris paribus, will be $40 and the discount
will increase to 33%.296 JOURNAL OF REAL ESTATE RESEARCH
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Accounting Issues. It was stated earlier that some property companies undertake
property trading. Property designated for trading is held in the balance sheet at the
lower of cost or market value. This implies that trading stock will never be shown in
the accounts above its market value but it might sometimes be below it. If assets are
recorded below their market value, the calculated NAV and therefore the discount will
be reduced. Although the sample of companies included in this study have relatively
small amounts of trading stock in their balance sheets, we include a variable that
controls for this factor.
Data and Methodology
An important source of data for this study is the SBC Warburg Annual Reviews of
the Property Share Sector for the years 1993, 1994 and 1995. The reviews contain
standardized balance sheets for forty-four listed U.K. property companies.8 These
companies account for more than 90% of the market capitalization of the listed
property company sector. By using the Warburg sample as the basis for this study,
we necessarily exclude the smallest property companies. However, the sample set
consists of property investment companies with relatively little trading stock included
in their accounts. The criterion adopted for the ﬁnal subset of companies required
every company to have three years of data available. This criterion maximized the
consistency over the study period but resulted in a reduction in our ﬁnal sample to
thirty companies and ninety observations.
For each company the discount to NAV (DISC) was calculated on the following basis:
Discount 5 100.(NAV 2 MC)/NAV
where:
NAV 5 Net asset value;9 and
MC 5 Market capitalization.
It is worth considering the parallel between the NAVs commonly used in the analysis
of closed-end fund discounts and the NAVs of the property companies used in this
study. We argue that the property company NAVs, derived from contemporaneous
estimates of the market value of property assets, provide acceptable proxies for true
NAVs. U.K. property companies have their investment assets appraised annually by
independent professional appraisers. The professional association of appraisers, the
RICS, provides strict guidance on the methods used in asset valuation that ensures
consistency both between companies and over time. In effect, the appraiser estimates
the market value of each individual property owned by the property company.
Although each appraisal will contain both systematic and unsystematic error, Geltner
(1993) shows that purely random appraisal error is diversiﬁed away in a portfolio
leaving only a relatively small amount of systematic error.10 Since the individual NAVs
are analyzed cross-sectionally, any systematic bias should not affect the contribution
afforded by individual explanatory factors.INVESTOR SENTIMENT AND NOISE TRADERS 297
Notwithstanding, there are two possible sources of error in the NAV calculations for
which we account in our analysis. The ﬁrst potential source of error arises from the
treatment of property held for trading. Trading property is usually shown in the
accounts at the lower of cost or net realizable value. In almost all the companies the
proportion of trading stock is small and will therefore not affect our estimated NAV
signiﬁcantly. To account for any remaining bias caused by this factor, we create an
explanatory variable (TRAD) which is deﬁned as trading stock as a proportion of
balance sheet value.
The second potential source of error is development activity. Properties in the course
of development are held in the balance sheet at cost, that is acquisition value and
accumulated cost (including, in most cases, capitalized interest). The inclusion of
capitalized interest increases the book value of the developed properties and thereby
provides a close approximation to market values. Furthermore, the degree of bias in
this study arising from the effect of unﬁnished properties will be low because the
period covered was characterized by low development activity.
The ﬁrst task in the analysis was to explore the factors that might explain the cross-
sectional variation in the discount to net assets observed in our sample. We therefore
expressed the discount as a function of the hypothesized variables and used ordinary
least squares regression in the following model.
DISC 5 ƒ(CONSTANT, ADMINRAT, GEAR, INSIDE, MEANRET, PERCGT, SIZE,
TRAD, SECDISC)
The computation of the individual variables is described below.
Eight independent variables were deﬁned for inclusion in the analysis. ADMINRAT is
administrative costs as a percentage of the total value of the balance sheet and is
expected to have a positive coefﬁcient. GEAR is the variable that measures leverage,
is debt as a percentage of total balance sheet value and is expected to be positively
associated with the discount. INSIDE is the number of shares beneﬁcially and non-
beneﬁcially held by the directors as a percentage of total issued and fully paid capital.
There is no strong prior expectation as to the sign on this coefﬁcient. MEANRET is
the mean monthly return of each company for the three calendar years prior to each
balance sheet date. Following Malkiel (1995), we use mean return as a proxy for the
conﬁdence of the market in the management of the company. Although this proxy
omits any forward assessment of the competence of management,11 it does capture
the effect of ‘momentum’ that has been found to inﬂuence investors’ valuations of
relative performance. The coefﬁcient on MEANRET is expected to be negative.
PERCGT is each company’s reported liability to pay tax on capital gains as a
percentage of the balance sheet total and is expected to be positively related to the
discount. SIZE is the natural log of total balance sheet value, which is tentatively
expected to show a positive coefﬁcient. TRAD is trading stock (valued at cost) as a
percentage of the total value of the balance sheet. This is expected to be negatively
related to the discount.298 JOURNAL OF REAL ESTATE RESEARCH
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A problem that results from the use of accounting data is that there is no universal
balance sheet date and thus the individual company discounts are relevant to different
points of time in the year. Since this article is based on the hypothesis that an
important inﬂuence on any individual company’s DISC is ‘market sentiment,’ which
varies over across time, it is necessary to control for this factor in order to isolate the
effects of company speciﬁc variables. One possibility is simply to include a time
dummy for each balance sheet date. However, this approach would necessitate a large
number of variables with the consequent loss of degrees of freedom. Instead, we have
included a variable which measures the sector average discount as at each balance
sheet date (SECDISC)12 to control for the inﬂuence of market sentiment on each
company’s DISC.
Results
We estimated the model separately for each of the three years as well as for the
aggregate sample. There are some difﬁculties in conducting the annual analysis, in
particular, the loss of degrees of freedom from splitting the sample. Given the small
sample size of the annual data, we report only the results of the aggregated sample.13
Exhibit 2 shows two regressions that represent the results of this analysis: the ﬁrst
regression included the variable SECDISC and the second excluded it. The ﬁrst model
has some explanatory power. The adjusted R2 is 33% and the model as a whole is
signiﬁcant at well above the 5% level. While not all of the variables are signiﬁcant
at the 5% level, all of them have the expected sign. This model is consistent with the
view that a company’s discount increases as contingent capital gains tax liability, size
and the sector average discount increase. The discount is reduced where the company
has delivered high average monthly returns over the past three years and it holds
trading stock at cost in the balance sheet. Leverage, administrative costs, and insider
ownership appear to be unrelated to the DISC in individual companies at least over
the period of the study. White’s test indicates that there is no bias in the coefﬁcients
due to heteroskedasticity.
The model with SECDISC removed has more or less the same pattern of direction
and signiﬁcance amongst individual variables but has a much lower adjusted R2. This
shows some 50% of the variability in DISC explained by the model is due to the
SECDISC variable. SECDISC measures the sector average discount at the balance
sheet date. In other words positive or negative sentiment that is sector wide is an
important inﬂuence on individual company discounts.14 This result is fully in line with
the noise trader explanations of the DISC in property companies. Once again, White’s
test indicates no bias in the coefﬁcients due to heteroskedasticity.
The overall conclusion from this attempt to test the rational approach is remarkably
similar to that of the closed-end fund literature. Company speciﬁc factors do affect
individual company discounts but these are by no means the only factors at work.
Market wide sentiment is also an important determinant of individual company
discounts. The results in Exhibit 2 show how market wide sentiment affects the level
of individual company discounts. The next section shows how market wide sentimentINVESTOR SENTIMENT AND NOISE TRADERS 299
Exhibit 2
Regression of Discount against Rational Variables



































Note: t-Stats are in parentheses.
a Degrees of Freedom 5 81, Adjusted R2 5 0.33, Regression F (7,82) 5 3.27.**
b Degrees of Freedom 5 82, Adjusted R2 5 0.15, Regression F (8, 81) 5 6.53.**
* Signiﬁcant at the 10% level.
** Signiﬁcant at the 5% level.
creates, in equilibrium, a tendency for the shares of closed-end fund vehicles in
general, and property companies speciﬁcally, to trade at a DISC.
Noise Traders, Investor Sentiment and the DISC
It has long been recognized that there are, essentially, two types of capital market
participants: rational and irrational. Rational market participants trade on the basis of
unbiased estimates of future earnings derived from current information about
fundamentals. Irrational investors, or noise traders as they have been named (Kyle,
1985), trade not on information about fundamentals but on market sentiment. Such
sentiment might be due to the advice of popular investment commentators or simple
trading rules or might even emerge spontaneously. When asset prices are inﬂuenced
by sentiment in efﬁcient markets, rational investors engage in arbitrage and in so
doing ensure that prices converge to the levels warranted by current information.
Irrational investors can be active in efﬁcient markets but they will have little impact
on price because of arbitrage by rational investors. However, the efﬁcient market view
contrasts sharply with the arguments put forward by the ‘noise trader school’300 JOURNAL OF REAL ESTATE RESEARCH
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(Cuthbertson, 1996). Within the noise trader school, the inﬂuence of noise traders is
asserted to be pervasive and unlikely to be arbitraged away by rational investors. The
reason for this is that rational investors have ﬁnite horizons and noise trader sentiment
is both stochastic and systematic.
Research on the inﬂuence of irrational market participants has been carried out by
Shiller (1989, 1990) Shleifer and Vishny (1990) and Kirman (1993). However, we are
concerned with a model of the of the interaction of noise traders and rational investors
in asset markets put forward by De Long, Shleifer, Summers and Waldmann (DSSW)
(1990). They argue that when asset prices are forced above those warranted by
fundamentals because of positive or negative noise trader sentiment, mis-pricing will
not be fully arbitraged away. Three assumptions are crucial to the model.
The ﬁrst assumption is that rational investors are risk averse and have ﬁnite horizons.
There are four reasons why rational investors may have ﬁnite horizons. First, the
performance of fund managers (equated with rational investors) is assessed on a short
term, generally quarterly, basis. Second, individuals who hold shares often have a
need for liquidity. Third, if cash or assets are borrowed, the cumulative cost of the
transaction increases the longer the trade. Fourth, short sales are difﬁcult and costly
in the long term. Thus, rational investors are concerned with the interim resale price
of assets the unpredictability of which is exacerbated by the presence of noise traders
in the market.
A second assumption of the DSSW approach is that noise trader sentiment is
stochastic and cannot be predicted by rational investors. Therefore, rational investors,
concerned as they are with the interim resale price of assets, have to take into account
not only fundamental risk but also the risk that noise traders may have driven prices
further away from the fundamentals during the holding period. This risk exists even
if noise traders are not, at the start of the holding period, excessively optimistic or
pessimistic. Rational traders might believe that prices will return to their fundamental
values in the long run but stochastic noise trader sentiment may disturb the
relationship between prices and fundamentals in the interim.
A third assumption of the DSSW model is that noise trader risk, that is excess
volatility and the divergence of price form fundamentals, is correlated across assets.
In other words, noise trader risk is systematic. Were noise trader risk not market wide,
it would not be priced for the same reason that idiosyncratic fundamental risk is not
priced.
The DSSW model has a number of implications not least for the explanation of
ﬁnancial market anomalies. The implication that has most concern is that the presence
of noise traders in ﬁnancial markets results in a permanent deviation of price from
fundamental value. This is the result of rational traders having to bear noise trader
risk as well as fundamental risk. DSSW note that, in most cases, it is difﬁcult to
observe this mis-pricing because it is difﬁcult to correctly estimate fundamental
values. However, fundamental values can be estimated and are indeed given in theINVESTOR SENTIMENT AND NOISE TRADERS 301
case of closed-end mutual funds. DSSW thus argue that the noise trader hypothesis
explains why closed-end funds typically trade at a DISC.
This suggestion is elaborated on and investigated by Lee, Shleifer and Thaler (LST)
(1991). They suggest that there are actually four parts to the puzzle about closed-end
fund discounts and that the noise trader approach is more successful in explaining
this four-part puzzle than the rational approach. Brieﬂy, the four part puzzle is: (1)
closed-end funds typically start at a premium to NAV; (2) after listing, closed-end
funds move to a discount within a few months of trading; (3) the discount on closed-
end funds are subject to wide variation over time, and (4) discounts shrink when funds
are open ended or liquidated. To explain the four-part puzzle, LST add one further
assumption to the DSSW model—that of differing clienteles. LST argue that closed-
end fund stock is held predominately by small investors (equated by LST with noise
traders), while the underlying assets are held mainly by institutional investors,
(equated with rational investors). The LST argument is that closed-end fund shares
are subject to noise trader risk, whereas the assets held by closed end funds are not.
Thus, closed-end fund shares are riskier than closed-end fund assets, have to earn a
higher rate of return in equilibrium and are therefore priced below NAV (part two of
the puzzle). The initial premium (part one of the puzzle) arises from smart investors
taking advantage of noise traders by creating closed-end funds at times of positive
noise trader sentiment. The variation in time of the discount (part three of the puzzle)
is due to changes in noise trader expectations. Thus, discounts to NAV are a sentiment
indicator.
Applying the Noise Trader Approach
The LST approach can be applied directly to property companies. However, the
additional assumption of LST that shares and assets are held by differing clienteles
is worth exploring in the case of property companies. The logic of the model dictates
that the investors who trade the assets owned by property companies differ from the
investors who trade the shares of the property companies. If similar investors traded
both the assets and the shares of property companies, the same sentiment changes
would affect both and they would be equally risky. The assets held by property
companies are ofﬁce, retail and industrial real estate. These types of property are
primarily traded by professional and institutional investors. In contrast, the shares in
property companies are typically dominated by individual investors. Property company
shares provide the main vehicle by which small investors can take a position in the
property market when sentiment is positive.15
The purpose of the following sections is to present some evidence that property shares
are subject to noise trader sentiment.16 The tests we make of the noise trader
hypothesis are not as complete as those of LST because the data are sparse especially
with regard to property company assets. However, it is possible, for the property
company sectors to test ﬁve speciﬁc implications of the noise trader hypothesis. These
are:
1. Although the aggregate value of a property company’s shares will be
below its NAV, in the long term the value of property shares will be302 JOURNAL OF REAL ESTATE RESEARCH
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linked to the value of the underlying assets. Positive (negative) noise
trader sentiment will reduce (increase) the DISC over time but the
discount will ﬂuctuate around a long run average determined by the risk
premium, required by rational participants for bearing noise trader risk.
In other words, as LST and Cuthbertson (1996) suggest, noise trader
sentiment implies some degree of mean reversion in stock prices. One
way to calibrate and test the signiﬁcance of this relationship is to develop
a vector-error-correction model in which the restriction of cointegration
is imposed.17
2. Primary issues of equity will occur when market sentiment is positive
because entrepreneurs realize they can package property assets and sell
them to noise traders. With regard to closed-end funds, LST state, ‘‘ . . .
there is no ‘efﬁciency’ reason for closed-end funds. Like casinos and
snake oil, closed-end funds are a device by which smart entrepreneurs
take advantage of a less sophisticated public.’’ It is plausible that the
same reasoning applies to property companies. A further implication of
this argument is that initial public offerings of property companies will
sell to noise traders. Rational investors will wait until the discount
reestablishes itself before they buy property company shares.
3. Sectors that are affected by noise trader sentiment will show high levels
of correlation. Given the likelihood that noise traders are small investors
and small investors are known to invest in small capitalization stocks,
property company shares may be thought to exhibit high levels of
correlation with small capitalization stocks.
4. The DISC will be correlated with other indicators of sentiment not related
to real estate, for instance expectations about inﬂation, consumer
conﬁdence and industrial optimism.
5. Levels of discount will be highly correlated across funds.
Results
Relationship between the Property Sectors Index and the Index of NAVs
This section analyses the relationship between the FTA index of property shares
(PROP1) and the SBC Warburg index of property company NAVs18 (NAVP). No
adjustment for leverage is required, as in Barkham and Geltner (1995), since both of
these series represent shareholders’ funds, the former the market value and the latter
the book value, and, as such are based on approximately the same level of leverage.
Exhibit 3 shows that the two series move together. In both series the hypothesis of a
unit root could not be rejected in differences but could be in levels. It was thus
concluded that both series are I(1).
The Johansen (1991) procedure, using the Likelihood ratio test, rejected the hypothesis
that there were no cointegrating vectors (Likelihood ratio; 15.03**) but did not reject
the hypothesis that there was at most one cointegrating vector (Likelihood ratio:
0.019). The normalized coefﬁcient of NAVP was –0.748, which corresponds closely
with the expected discount. It suggests that the equilibrium relationship between
property shares and the property company NAVs is of the form:INVESTOR SENTIMENT AND NOISE TRADERS 303
Exhibit 3
Index of Property Shares (PROP1) and Index of Property
Company Net Asset Value (NAVP)
Prop Share Value 5 0.75 Net Asset Value
suggesting a long-term equilibrium discount of 25%. It is extremely interesting to
note that this result is almost the same as in a similar analysis of REITs. Goebel and
Ma (1993) ﬁnd, in a cointegration analysis, that an equilibrium relationship exists
between REIT share and REIT NAVs: speciﬁcally that REIT shares trade at 77% of
NAVs.
There has been some debate in recent years as to whether property shares are
‘property’ or ‘equity’ and attempts have been made to compare indices of property
shares with indices of the property market. The problem with this approach is that
the holdings of property companies or REITs may not correspond exactly or even
closely to the holdings on which direct property indices are based. In this work,
property shares are compared with an index of property company holdings albeit a
geared one. It can be seen that property shares in the long run are linked to the value
of the underlying assets, that is property shares are strongly related to the direct
property market as reﬂected by an appropriate index of the property market in which
property companies are invested.
We are interested not only in the long-term relationship but also in the short-term
movements about the long-term trend. Identiﬁcation of the cointegrating vector makes
it possible to estimate a vector error correction model to examine the short-term
dynamics of the relationship between property shares and property company NAVs.
This vector error correction model is shown in Exhibit 4. Two interesting ﬁndings304 JOURNAL OF REAL ESTATE RESEARCH
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Exhibit 4






































Adj. R2 20.015 0.504
Note: Normalized cointegrating equation: FTA (21) 5 1.00; NAV (21) 5 0.748 (25.6**). t-Stats are
in parentheses.
*Signiﬁcant at 10% level.
**Signiﬁcant at 5% level.
emerge from the equation. First, it can be seen that only one of the error correction
terms seems to be of reasonable size, that on NAV. This indicates that NAVs respond,
but not rapidly, to movements in property shares by moving back to the equilibrium
relationship. The error correction term on property shares is not signiﬁcant, nor are
the coefﬁcients on the lagged NAVs in the property share equation. This may be taken
to indicate that NAVs do not ‘Granger Cause’ property shares. However, we ﬁnd that
the coefﬁcients on the lagged property terms are signiﬁcant (at the ﬁrst and fourth
order) and this may indicate that property shares Granger Cause NAVs (Enders, 1995).
These ﬁndings are consistent with the notion that the value of property shares lead
NAVs. It should not, of course, be inferred that we are asserting that share price
movements cause, in a fundamental deterministic way, property company NAVs.
Property Company Initial Public Offerings and the Discount to NAV
The relationship between property company IPOs and the DISC in existing companies
can easily be seen graphically. A recent study by Sahi (1996) provides an illuminating
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The study is based on all property company IPOs from January 1986 to December
1995 and the sector average DISC produced by SBC Warburg.
Exhibit 5 shows all IPOs and the DISC. The majority of all property company IPOs
occur when the discounts are below the long-term average (20%). Few new property
companies come to the market when this discount is above the long-term average.
There appears to be something of a lag between the narrowing of the discount and
an increase in IPOs. This lag is consistent with the notion that it takes up to six
months to prepare a company for presentation to the market. There is some evidence
here for the notion of ‘hot issue’ markets. The market does indeed seem to respond
to positive sentiment in a way that is consistent with the idea that entrepreneurs
capitalize on the periods of positive sentiment.
The Property Sector’s Correlation with Small Capitalization Stocks
This part of the analysis investigates whether the property sector is more highly
correlated with small capitalization stocks than with the stock market as a whole as
indicated by the FTA All-Share Index. To indicate smaller capitalization stock
performance we have used the Hoare Govett Index of Small Company shares. The
contemporaneous correlation coefﬁcient between the returns of the property sector
and the small cap stock index is 0.33, while the correlation of the property sector and
the FTA All-Share Index is only 0.16. The results show that property shares are more
highly correlated with the small company index and thus we conclude that the results
of this simple analysis are consistent with the noise trader hypothesis. This result
should perhaps be treated with caution since some of the ﬁrms included in the FTA
Property Index are themselves small capitalization stocks. On the other hand, there is
evidence that indicates REIT returns are correlated with returns on small capitalization
stocks, a ﬁnding that lends credence to our results (Gyourko and Keim, 1992; and
Liu and Mei, 1992). Furthermore, as has been explained, the majority of small
property companies are excluded from this study.
The Discount to NAV and Non-property Indicators of ‘Sentiment’
It is not immediately obvious which indicators of sentiment might give some insight
into the nature of the process leading to the formation of positive noise trader
sentiment in the property market. The theory suggests that indicators of sentiment
ought to be market-wide and perhaps even economy-wide. Usefully, from the
perspective of this study, several agencies in the U.K. produce survey-based indices
of consumer, industrial and investor sentiment. We have made use of the three best
known of these: the index of industrial conﬁdence produced by the Confederation of
British Industry (CBI), the index of consumer conﬁdence produced by the Gallup
Polling Organization (Gallup) and the index of inﬂation expectations produce by
Money Markets International (MMI).
The CBI index of industrial conﬁdence is based on a sample of British manufacturing
ﬁrms. The sample remains the same over time and replies from ﬁrms in the sample
are weighted according to the proportion of manufacturing net output accounted forINVESTOR SENTIMENT AND NOISE TRADERS 307
Exhibit 6
OLS Regression Results, Sector Average Discount against Inﬂation








Mean Discount (%) 22.24
Adjusted R2 0.741
Durbin-Watson 2.06
Note: t-Stats are in parenthesis.
*Signiﬁcant at the 10% level.
**Signiﬁcant at the 5% level.
by the ﬁrm’s industry and employment size group. The survey reports the balance of
ﬁrms that are optimistic about the future. Thus, 124 means that on balance 24% of
the sample are more optimistic about the future than they were in the previous quarter.
The Gallup index of consumer conﬁdence differs slightly. A sample of consumers are
asked whether they expect that their family’s ﬁnancial situation will change over the
next twelve months. Those answering ‘a lot better’ or ‘a little better’ are classed as
optimists, while those answering ‘a little worse’ or ‘a lot worse’ are classed as
pessimists. Other categories include no change or ‘don’t know.’ The index is simply
the percentage optimists minus the percentage pessimists. The MMI index measures
the rate of inﬂation in the next month expected by a variety of individuals of inﬂuence
working in industry commerce and the economics profession. These variables have
been regressed against the DISC and the results are shown in Exhibit 6.
Exhibit 6 shows that the average sector discount as calculated by SBC Warburg is
strongly autocorrelated. However, once this autoregressive process is reﬂected in the
regression, the MMI index of inﬂation expectations and the CBI index of industrial
optimism are both signiﬁcant inﬂuences on the DISC. The Gallup index of consumer
conﬁdence is insigniﬁcant and so is dropped from the equation. Moreover, the signs
on the coefﬁcients are plausible. The index of industrial optimism is negatively related
to the discount. Thus, when conﬁdence is improving the discount is falling. As
expected inﬂation rises so also does the DISC, possibly due to the anticipation of
increased interest rates. Of course, we must be quite clear about the inference we
draw from these results. It is not that changes in optimism or expectations about
inﬂation cause the DISC to change but that noise trader sentiment, which may only
be observed via the DISC, is correlated with economy-wide indicators of sentiment.
This ﬁnding does not conﬁrm the noise trader hypothesis but it is consistent with it.308 JOURNAL OF REAL ESTATE RESEARCH
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Correlation between the Discount to NAV
There is insufﬁcient data to fully examine the implication of the noise trader
hypothesis that the DISC across all property companies should be highly correlated.
That is, periods of negative sentiment should affect all companies in the sector by
increasing their discount and periods of positive sentiment should bring about sector
wide lowering of the discounts, possibly even inducing property companies to trade
at a premium. However, some indication that this is indeed the case can be found in
the results of the cross-sectional analysis presented in Exhibit 2.
In the cross-sectional analysis, the sector average discount was included as an
explanatory variable. This was the single most important variable in explaining the
variation of the individual company’s discount. To be more precise, omission of the
sector average resulted in the adjusted R2 of the model falling from 33% to 15%. This
indicates that there is a high degree of correlation across all property companies in
the DISC and is entirely consistent with the noise trader hypothesis.
Conclusion
Property company shares trade, in general, at a discount to their NAV. The aim of
this article has been to evaluate two hypotheses that purport to explain this
phenomenon. The ﬁrst hypothesis is that company-speciﬁc factors such as contingent
taxation, management quality and the liquidity of assets account for the discount.
These factors appear to have had some success in explaining closed-end fund
discounts and this is perhaps more weakly true for property companies. Four variables
appear to explain about 15% of the cross-sectional variance in property company
discounts: contingent capital gains tax, size, holdings of trading stock and historic
monthly returns These variables are not implausible. However, the adjusted R2 of the
model is more than doubled by the inclusion of the variable measuring the sector
average discount. The effectiveness of this proxy suggests that market-wide sentiment
is just as inﬂuential as speciﬁc company factors in explaining the discount or premium
to NAV in property companies. Indeed one of the weaknesses of the rational approach
mentioned by LST is that it cannot explain why the discount varies so much over
time.
The second hypothesis is more complicated. We have referred to it as the noise trader
hypothesis. Brieﬂy, the hypothesis suggests that closed-end funds and, by extension
property companies, are subject to the attention of noise traders who overestimate
changes in the fundamental value of assets. These traders impound a short-term resale
price risk into the value of securities. This risk is market wide and cannot be
diversiﬁed and so is priced in equilibrium. DSSW and LST put this forward as a
reason why closed-end funds, on average, trade at a DISC and we have attempted to
evaluate the argument with respect to property companies.
The evidence for the noise trader hypothesis with respect to property companies is
not overwhelming but, in aggregate, it is signiﬁcant. Property shares appear
fundamentally linked to the value of the underlying property assets but ﬂuctuate fromINVESTOR SENTIMENT AND NOISE TRADERS 309
this equilibrium relationship with a moderate speed of adjustment mechanism.
Property company IPOs are somewhat correlated with periods of reverse discount.
Property shares have a slightly higher correlation with small cap stocks than with the
all share index. The DISC is associated with other non-property-related indicators of
conﬁdence. Finally, the DISC is highly correlated across funds. All of these factors
indicate that it is sentiment that determines the DISCs in property companies. In
addition, we can adduce the evidence in favor of the noise trader hypothesis explaining
the DISC of closed-end mutual funds. To the extent that unpredictable changes in
sentiment impound a resale price risk into property shares, this sentiment can be taken
as an explanation of the DISC in property shares.
What are the implications of these ﬁndings? One is that property shares are likely to
provide a return that can differ markedly from the return on the underlying assets
over a relatively long period.19 Not only has the investor to contend with leverage and
the fact that property company portfolios may not resemble the market portfolio of
properties but they are also subject to the unrealistic expectations of noise traders.
Another potential implication is that noise traders exacerbate overbuilding in the
property market. To the extent that high values of property shares reduce the cost of
capital to property companies it may result, at times of over optimism, in property
companies raising funds for and initiating the most marginal development schemes.
The situation will be worsened if the private capital markets follow the public market.
Endnotes
1 Although a few property companies listed on the U.K. stock exchange pursue non-property
activities, these activities make a very small contribution to the proﬁts of individual companies
and, in particular, are insigniﬁcant in the case of the companies included in this study.
2 Trading assets are held at the lower of cost and net realizable value.
3 The terms closed end and open end refer to the rules about capital issue and redemption to
which each type of fund are subject. Open-end funds issue units on demand and must redeem
outstanding units on demand at the NAV per share of the fund. Thus, the capital of open-end
funds is highly elastic and individual unit holders trade directly with the fund. The capital of
closed-end funds is inelastic in the short run. Closed-end funds are under no obligation to
redeem capital once it has been issued and shareholder wishing to liquidate their position must
trade with other investors. Likewise, unless a new issue of shares is made to raise capital,
investors wishing to buy stock must trade with other shareholders in the open market. Since
they are ‘public limited liability joint stock companies,’ property companies closely resemble
closed-end funds. Property companies periodically issue new shares to increase their capital
base but they are under no obligation to redeem these shares. To liquidate their position,
investors have to trade with other investors.
4 The authors are aware of only two U.K. studies on this issue: Blandon (1983) and Adams and
Venmore-Rowland (1989).
5 One factor that might, potentially at least, militate against the analysis of property companies,
as a special case of closed-end mutual funds, is the pursuit of non-property activities. In our
sample ﬁve companies engage in activities that are not ‘pure’ property investment and trading.
In four out ﬁve cases, this additional activity involves the receipt of operating income from
property assets held (namely a racecourse, a mine, a canal and railway) but the revenue from
these activities is trivial compared with total revenue as are the assets as a proportion of total310 JOURNAL OF REAL ESTATE RESEARCH
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assets. For one company, 25% of its assets are shares in other property companies. We have
included these companies in our analysis for three reasons. First, all of the non-property
activities are relatively unimportant. Second, all of the non-property activities are linked directly
to property investment activity (e.g., in the case of the railway, the company owns an industrial
estate that just happens to feature a private railway). Third, experimentation with the data
indicates that non-property income has no inﬂuence on the discount when other variables are
controlled for.
6 It is Malkiel (1995) who has coined the term ‘rational’ approach.
7 Management of closed-end funds is obliged to publish the market value of the securities they
hold.
8 Property companies vary signiﬁcantly in the format in which their accounts are presented as
well as in their accounting policies (Barkham and Purdy, 1992). Thus, the analysis undertaken
by SBC Warburg provides a standardized data source invaluable to researchers.
9 We have not included convertible debt as part of NAV nor the market value of this debt as
part of the market capitalization of the ﬁrm.
10 See also Barkham and Geltner (1994).
11 An additional difﬁculty is that the total returns data for property companies is for calendar
years, whereas the balance sheet dates are spread throughout the year. Thus, the geometric mean
return refers to a period just before the balance sheet date for some companies and just after it
for others.
12 Provided by SBC Warburg.
13 The results of the separate annual regressions are generally consistent with the aggregated
sample. In each of the three years, the only variables that are signiﬁcant are SECDISC and
TRAD. White’s test indicates no heteroskedasticity problem in any of the individual years.
14 We experimented with the use of time dummies. A number of time dummies were signiﬁcant,
conﬁrming the effect of market sentiment on individual company discounts. In the interests of
parsimony, we preferred to use the SECDISC variable.
15 Of course, more sophisticated investors can simulate property returns with a portfolio of other
assets (Ward and Henry, 1995).
16 As has been shown, property companies provide a useful opportunity to apply the noise trader
model since, as with closed-end funds, although not as frequently, the value of the fundamental
portfolio is ‘observable’. Thus, the effect of noise trader sentiment can be seen in the DISC of
individual companies or, more appropriately, the sector DISC. It should be noted, however, for
the model to hold the discount should represent market wide sentiment not just property sector
sentiment.
17 This restriction, of course, is not based on an assumption of a cointegrating relationship but
on the demonstration of this relationship.
18 The cointegration hypothesis will assert that the share prices and NAVs are related on a one-
to-one basis. Because the FTA Property Share sector index and the NAV index were compiled
on different bases, an adjusted NAV index was created by multiplying the Warburg estimated
discount (per share) by the stock price index. The resulting index of NAV was correlated with
the independent index of NAV by more than 99%.
19 SBC Warburg estimate that returns to property shares only resemble those of direct property
over a ﬁve-year period and any shorter holding period results in some divergence.INVESTOR SENTIMENT AND NOISE TRADERS 311
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